Duquesne Law Review
Volume 28

Number 4

Article 8

1990

Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue to Receive a Charitable
Organization Tax Exemption Under Pennsylvania Law?
Robert J. Hannen

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Hannen, Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue to Receive a Charitable Organization Tax
Exemption Under Pennsylvania Law?, 28 Duq. L. Rev. 727 (1990).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol28/iss4/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue To
Receive A Charitable Organization Tax Exemption
Under Pennsylvania Law?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Local taxes come in a variety of forms and naturally include
property taxes and city wage taxes. Of all the local taxes, the most
significant source of local tax revenue generally is property taxes.'
Despite the significant role which property taxes play in raising
revenues for local municipalities, the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides for an exemption from property taxes when certain criteria are satisfied.2 Certainly, these property tax exemptions were
designed to lessen the burden of the continued existence and operations of charitable organizations. However, these property tax exemptions may be somewhat damaging to the local municipalities
themselves. "A liberal construction of exemption provisions results
in the loss of a major source of municipal revenue and places a
greater burden on nonexempt tax payers .... ,, In the city of
Pittsburgh, for instance, this phenomenon has apparently manifested itself in the form of an increased city wage tax. Yet, a sampling of hospitals located in Allegheny County during the fiscal
year 1987-88 indicates that at least several of the hospitals sampled enjoyed substantial profits, yet contributed relatively little to
the community in the way of charitable donations." The tax exemption which these hospitals have enjoyed has resulted in sub1. "Property taxes are the most important source of municipal revenue. For example,
in 1970 to 1971 they comprised 64% of general revenue raised by local governments." Utah
County., Etc. v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265, 268 n.5 (Utah 1985) citing Advisory Comm'n of Intergovernmental Relations, The Property Tax in a Changing Environment 99 (1974).
2. The Constitutional exemption from property taxes is founded in PA. CONST. art.
VIII § 2 (a) which provides: "The General Assembly may by law exempt from taxation:
(v.) Institutions of purely public charity, but in the case of any real property tax
exemptions only that portion of real property of such institutions which is actually
and regularly used for the purposes of the institution.
PA. CONST. art. VIII § 2.
3. Utah County., Etc. v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1985).
4. The Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 4, 1990, at A13 col. 1. The Pittsburgh Press compiled a
list of the "financial condition of 23 hospitals in Allegheny County during the fiscal year
1987-88. All dollar amounts are in millions." The list is set forth as follows:
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stantial lost revenues for the local municipalities. For instance, Allegheny General Hospital experienced a profit of $36.4 million in
fiscal year 1988 on net revenues of $248.1 million. If fully taxed,
Allegheny General Hospital would have paid almost $400,000 in
county property taxes alone.'
The scope of this comment will explore whether nonprofit hospitals should continue to receive the "blanket" property tax exemptions which they currently enjoy. The analysis will center on the
fact that the foundation of these exemptions is premised on charitable organization tax exemptions.

Hospital

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Allegheny General
Children's
Ohio Valley
Sewickly Valley
St. Margaret Memorial
Presbyterian
McKeesport
N. Hills Passavant
St. Clair
Shadyside
Mercy Hospital
Magee-Womens
Allegheny Valley
West Penn
Jefferson*
Suburban General*
South Side*
Montefiore
Divine Providence*
St. Francis
Forbes Health
Braddock General
Central Medical

Total

Net
revenue

Profit

Profit
margin

Free
care

Charity
index

$248.1
$108.5
$25.8
$59.1
$35.2
$236.4
$63.1
$51.3
$61.9
$96.5
$137.6
$85.6
$44.3
$129.8
$90.0
$25.8
$36.6
$100.5
$23.5
$129.9
$100.0
$27.6
$36.9

$36.4
$13.8
$2.8
$6.2
$3.4
$22.6
$6.0
$4.0
$4.2
$4.5
$5.8
$3.4
$1.7
$4.9
$3.3
$.61
$.84
$1.5
$.31
$.21
-$.95
-$.63
-$6.0

14.7%
12.7%
10.7%
10.5%
9.8%
9.6%
9.5%
7.8%
6.9%
4.6%
4.2%
3.9%
3.9%
3.8%
3.7%
2.4%
2.3%
1.5%
1.3%
0.2%
-1.0%
-2.3%
-16.2%

$3.4
$3.3
$.04
$1.5
$.44
$2.1
$.66
$.46
$.23
$1.0
$2.6
$3.0
$.12
$5.1
$4.0
$1.0
$1.1
NA
$1.1
$4.1
$3.6
$.29
$.7

1.4%
3.0%
0.2%
2.5%
1.2%
0.9%
1.0%
0.9%
0.4%
1.1%
1.9%
3.5%
0.3%
3.9%
4.4%
3.9%
3.0%
NA
4.6%
3.2%
3.6%
1.0%
1.9%

$1,954

$118.8

6.1%

$40.2

2.1%

* Hospitals that include bad debt in free care figures.
Source: Hospital financial statements and interviews.
Net revenue: Money hospitals collected for services
left over after hospitals paid all expenses. Hospitals
penses." Profit margin: Percentage of net revenue
Amount hospitals say they gave to people they knew
somewhat inflated because hospitals generally list it
price they collect from most insurers. Charity index:
net revenues. Id.
5. The Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 4, 1990, at A13,

and from investments. Profit: Money
call this "Excess of revenues over exremaining after expenses. Free care:
had no means of paying. This figure is
as full retail price, not the discounted
Free care measured as a percentage of
col. 2.
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II.

THE PENNSYLVANIA

APPROACH

The Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that the Pennsylvania Legislature may exempt institutions of purely public charity
from taxation.' In Title 61 of the Pennsylvania Code, Section 32.1,
public hospitals are included as examples of charitable organizations.7 Likewise, in Title 72 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
Annotated, Sections 5020 - 204, hospitals are exempted from property taxes in certain circumstances. a
The Pennsylvania courts have considered, on a number of occasions, the question of whether an institution is entitled to retain or
receive tax-exempt status. The most significant case in this field,
6.

See supra, note 2.

7.

61 PA. CODE 32.1 (1985) provides:

Charitable Organization - a charitable organization is a group or body of persons
which is created and which exists predominantly for the purpose of performing a
humane service; promoting the good and welfare of the aged, infirm, or
distressed....

The persons entitled to benefit from services performed by the organization shall be
chosen from a class of persons substantial and not predetermined in number. The
funds of the organization shall be predominantly derived from public or private contributions, and the organization shall be operated without pecuniary benefit to any
officer, member or shareholder, except as reasonable compensation for actual services
rendered to the organization. The term does not include an organization whose predominant purpose is to conduct noncharitable events or activities, even though the
proceeds derived are donated to an exempt organization as defined herein. The following constitute examples of charitable organizations.
(i) Organizations such as . . .public hospitals ....
61 PA. CODE § 32.1 (1985).
8. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5020-204 (Purdon 1989) is entitled "Exemptions from
taxation" and provides:
(a) The following property shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town,
township, road, poor and school tax, to wit:

(3) All hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations and
institutions of learning, benevolence, or charity, including fire and rescue stations, with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and
enjoyment of the same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private
charity: Provided, That the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to
the support and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and
the necessary increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other purpose; . . .
72 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 5020-204 (Purdon 1989).
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however, is Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth.9 In
Hospital Utilization Project, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated that although the Pennsylvania Code set forth a definition
of charitable organization, 0 the origin of charitable exemption in
the Pennsylvania statutes was Article VIII, section 2 (a)(v)of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania legislature was constitutionally limited to exempt only those charitable
organizations which were institutions of "purely public charity."
However, the legislative determination was to be given great deference. 1 Regardless of whether an institution would qualify as a
"charitable organization," as defined by the Pennsylvania Code,' 2
an institution must qualify as a "purely public charity" under the
Pennsylvania Constitution."3 Moreover, any institution or organization which sought tax-exempt status, had the affirmative burden
to prove it was entitled to that status."'
Neither the Pennsylvania Constitution nor Pennsylvania statutes define exactly what constitutes a "purely public charity." But
through Pennsylvania case law, a set of criteria has evolved for
making such a determination.
As early as 1892, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the
question of a "purely public charity" in Episcopal Academy v.
5 In Episcopal Academy,
Philadelphia."
the court stated:
[Ilt may be safely said that whatever is gratuitously done or given in relief
of the public burdens, or for the advancement of the public good, is a public
charity. In every such case, as the public is the beneficiary, the charity is a
public charity. As no private or pecuniary return is reserved to the giver or
any particular person, but all the benefit resulting from the gift or act goes
to the public, it is a "purely public charity;" the word "purely" being
equivalent to the word "wholly"."
9. 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306 (1985).
10. See supra, note 2.
11. In Hospital Utilization Project, the court stated that there is a presumption that
the legislature does not intend to violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. 487 A.2d 1306, 1312
(1985). Nonetheless, "[Sltatutory provisions exempting persons or property from taxation
must be strictly construed." Id.
12. See supra, note 7.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 150 Pa. 565, 25 A. 55 (1892).

16. 25 A. at 56. The court continued its analysis by stating:
[Ain institution that is in its nature and purposes a purely public charity does not
lose its character as such under the tax laws, if it receives a revenue from the recipients of its bounty sufficient to keep it in operation. It must not go beyond self-support. When a charity embarks in business for profit, it is liable to taxation like any
other business establishment ...
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded upon its early concept of a "purely public charity" in YMCA Ass'n of Germantown
1 7 In YMCA,
v. Philadelphia.
the court stated:
In all our decisions on this subject there can be discerned as a prerequisite
to the taxation exemption of an institution claiming to be benevolent or
charitable that it, or the portion of its property in respect to which the exemption is claimed, must possess an eleemosynary characteristic not possessed by institutions or property devoted to private gain or profit. What is
"given" must be more nearly gratuitous than for a price which impresses
one as being proportionate to the services rendered.18

The court further set forth several characteristics of an organized
charity.
First, whatever it does for others is done free of charge, or at least so nearly
free of charge as to make the charges nominal or negligible; second, that
those to whom it renders help or services are those who are unable to provide themselves with what the institution provides for them, that is, they
are legitimate subjects of charity."9

The two characteristics set forth by the court were not arbitrary
in nature. The underlying rationale or foundation, with respect to
these two characteristics, concerns the burden placed on the government by society.
Every inhabitant and every parcel of property receives governmental protection. Such protection costs money. When any inhabitant fails to contribute his share of the costs of this protection, some other inhabitant must
contribute more than his fair share of that cost. .

.

. Any institution which

by its charitable activities relieves the government of part of this burden is
conferring a pecuniary benefit upon the body politic, and in receiving exemption from taxation it is merely being given a "quid pro quo" for its services in providing something which otherwise the government would have to
provide.. . . The measure of an institution's gratuitous aid to those requiring it is the measure by which the government is relieved of its
responsibilities."

"Although the YMCA language has not gone without modification throughout the years, its underlying philosophy has provided
a sound base upon which to build the parameters for a 'purely
public charity.' "21 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to
Id. at 57.
17. 323 Pa. 401, 187 A. 204 (1936).
18. 187 A. at 208.
19. Id. at 209.
20. Id. at 210.
21. Hospital Utilization Project, 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306, 1314 (1985).
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the YMCA rationale in In re Ogontz School. 22 Furthermore, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to adhere strictly
to the language in YMCA, the underlying rationale of YMCA continued to provide the foundation for the court's decision in Appeal
of Vanguard School 23 and in West Allegheny Hospital v. Board of
Property Assessment.2 4
In West Allegheny Hospital, the issue on appeal was whether
the health care facilities of West Allegheny Hospital, a non-profit
corporation, were exempt from real estate taxes. 25 The court
opined that the hospital, on the basis of several factors, had satisfied the "purely public" aspect of Article VIII, Section 2 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 26 First, the "[b]ylaws of the corporation provide that 'no distinction shall be made in the admission or
treatment of patients in regard to race, color, creed, national origin
or sex,' a policy which has been adhered to in practice."2 Second,
the hospital provided comprehensive health care without regard to
a patient's ability to pay.2"
The court then addressed whether the hospital had been "endowed and maintained by public or private charity." Although the
hospital received substantial donations, these donations were not
sufficient to offset the costs of the hospital.29 The operating expenses and capital expenditures which could not be covered by donations were then satisfied through revenues from patient billings. 30 The majority, however, stated that this was not a sufficient
basis for denying tax-exempt status to the hospital 31 in light of the
22. 361 Pa. 284, 65 A.2d 150 (1949). In Ogontz, the court determined that the Ogontz
School, a non-profit corporation operating as a private school, did not relieve the government of any burdens and could not be classified, under any test, as a "purely public charity." Id. at 153.
23. 430 Pa. 378, 243 A.2d 323 (1968). In Vanguard, the court rejected the argument
that YMCA stands for the proposition that only the measure of whether the tax-exempt
status should be granted is the degree to which the institution relieves the government of its
responsibilities. Id.
24. 500 Pa. 236, 455 A.2d 1170 (1982). In West Allegheny Hospital, the court rejected
strict adherence to the notion that a "purely public charity" may charge only a nominal fee
to its beneficiaries. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1171. The word "purely" in the context of "purely public charity" was
designed to emphasize the word "public" and not "charity". Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1172.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1172-73.
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language of the statute.2 Thus, the court determined that West
Allegheny Hospital was entitled to retain its tax- exempt status.
The dissent contended, however, that "[t]he majority appear[ed]
to have centered its analysis upon the fact that [West Allegheny
Hospital] is a hospital and conclude[d] that because a hospital promotes health, if it is public, it should be tax-exempt. ' 33 But the
dissent reasoned that in order to obtain/retain tax-exempt status,
the burden was on the party claiming the exemption to show that
the entire institution is (1) one of "purely public charity;" (2) was
founded by public or private charity; and (3) is maintained by
34
public or private charity.
The dissent conceded that adherence by West Allegheny Hospital to its by-laws and its "open-admission policy" "may satisfy the
public part of the first prong of the test,"3 5 but, the dissent warned
that the "first prong also required a pure charity element which is
not satisfied merely by the dispensing of medical service."3 6
With respect to the second prong of the test, the dissent, in contrast with the majority, stated that the key question "is not
whether the institution's activities comply with a definition of
charitable purpose but, rather, was the institution begun or
founded by gift, either public or private. The fact that the [hospital] is "non-profit" is not decisive of the issue. 37 The dissent determined that this second factor was not satisfied. 8
Finally, the dissent concluded that the third prong of the test
was not satisfied. The dissent stated:
The majority's use of the word "revenue" in the proviso to section 204(a)(3)
[72 P.S. 5020 - 204] in order to overcome the blatant fact that Drs. Roberts
and Grilli [the incorporators of West Allegheny Hospital] have passed the
32. See supra, note 6. The majority determined that 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5020 204 permits the revenues from patient billing to be used to meet operating costs and capital
expenditures. 455 A.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Pa. 1982).
33. 455 A.2d at 1173.
34. Id. at 1173-74.
35. Id. at 1174.
36. Id. at 1174 n.1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1174-75. The original property upon which West Allegheny Hospital is situated was purchased by Drs. Roberts and Grilli for less than $40,000, was deeded to a corporation (Tioga Corporation) whose principal shareholders were Drs. Roberts and Grilli, and
later sold to West Allegheny Hospital (a non-profit corporation incorporated by Drs. Roberts and Grilli and their wives) for $590,000. Id.
Moreover, West Allegheny hospital had previously paid rent to Tioga Corporation, had
not made its first capital acquisition until nine years after its incorporation and had not
been founded by gift but rather had received loans which it repaid with interest. Id.
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substantial operating costs and capital acquisition costs on to the patients
and/or the public without any significant accompanying gifts at founding or
for maintenance is not in accord with the required strict construction of the
statute involved nor the constitutional concept of a "purely public
charity."39'

Thus, the dissent declared that West Allegheny Hospital should
40
not be entitled to tax exemption under these circumstances.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Hospital Utilization
Project, set forth a list of criteria which must be satisfied in order
to qualify as a purely public charity. According to the court,
it can be concluded that an entity qualifies as a purely public charity if it
possesses the following characteristics...
(a) Advances a charitable purpose;
(b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its
services;
(c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity;
(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and
(e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive.41

This multifactor test has also been used in cases subsequent
42
to Hospital Utilization Project.
According to the court in Hospital Utilization Project,43 in order
to satisfy the criterion requiring advancement of a charitable purpose an institution would have to satisfy the definitions set forth in
44
In re Hill School.
The word "charitable", in a legal sense, includes every gift for a general
public use, to be applied, consistent with existing laws, for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, moral, physical or social standpoint. In its broadest meaning it is understood "to refer to something done or given for the benefit of
our fellows or the public."'4 5

Although a "purely public charity does not cease to be such when
39. Id. at 1174-75. Patients paid or caused to be paid approximately 97% of the
amounts billed for out-patient care. Id. Moreover, West Allegheny Hospital employed a collection agency to assist in collecting outstanding patient accounts. Id. Additionally, physicians at West Allegheny Hospital paid a "bed-tax" to the hospital; and West Allegheny
Hospital received payments from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for treatment of those
patients on welfare. Id. at 1175.
40. Id.
41. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985).
42. See, e.g., Scripture Union v. Deitch, 109 Pa. Commw. 272, 531 A.2d 64, 66 (1987).
43. 487 A.2d 1306,1315 (Pa. 1985).
44. 370 Pa. 21, 87 A.2d 259 (1952).
45. 487 A.2d at 1315, quoting, In re Hill School, 87 A.2d at 262.
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it receives some payment for its services," 4' 6 an institution is not
considered charitable in the legal sense if the direct beneficiaries of
the institution are its fee-paying clients and not the general
47
public.
With respect to the second factor, the court in Hospital Utilization Project looked to the fact that the institution did not offer
any free services to clients.4 8 Further, the court considered the fact
that the institution charged its clients fees which approximated actual cost.49 Additionally, the court noted that "[s]ince [the institution] provides no financial aid, an applicant who cannot afford to
pay for its statistical reports will not be serviced."5 0 The third factor requires that the entity benefit a substantial and indefinite
class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity. The court
compared Hospital Utilization Project (HUP) with the language
in West Allegheny Hospital5 1 and found that, unlike West Allegheny Hospital, HUP did not satisfy this factor.2
The fourth factor requires the institution to relieve the government of some of its burden. The court determined that the service
that HUP provides is not one traditionally done by the government and thus HUP did not relieve the government of its
burden.3
The court also determined that HUP did not satisfy the fifth
factor. The court determined that HUP did not operate entirely
free from private profit motive. The essential elements in the
court's determination were that "[HUP's] officers and directors are
well paid and [HUP] is able to accumulate a profit which is invested to upgrade the computer equipment essential to its
54
operation.
46. 487 A.2d at 1315, quoting, In re Hill School, 87 A.2d at 263.
47. 487 A.2d at 1317.
48. Id. at 1314, 1317.
49. Id. at 1317. In reference to institutions which charge fees approximating actual
cost, the court cited to In're Ogontz School, supra, for the proposition that "[aln organization which provides all its services for actual cost is engaged in a commercial enterprise." Id.
at 1314.
50. Id. at 1316.
51. See supra, notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
52. Id. at 1316-17. The court noted that nothing in the record supported a finding that
HUP provides services with regard to the client's ability to pay. Id. at 1316. Moreover, the
court noted that "HUP's beneficiaries, hospitals and health care facilities are definite in
number and, when viewed as administrative entities, are not legitimate objects of charity."
Id. at 1317.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1317-18.
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The concept of reevaluating whether hospitals and health organizations actually satisfy charitable organization property tax exemption provisions has already been implemented in several jurisdictions in the United States. One jurisdiction which has
undertaken such a task is Utah. 5 The watershed of this development is Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care.5 6 The Supreme Court of Utah in Intermountain Health Care acknowledged that treatment of the ill had traditionally been regarded as
charitable; 7 however, the court stated "we deem it important to
scrutinize the contemporary social and economic context of such
care. We are convinced that traditional assumptions bear little relationship to the economics of the medical-industrial complex of
the 1980's. ' ' 58 According to the court, there had been a "revolution

in health care that transformed a 'healing profession' into an enormous and complex industry, employing millions of people and accounting for a substantial proportion of our gross national prod' This, in turn, has resulted
uct."59
in an increase in the cost of
medical care and services and a corresponding increase in competition between providers of medical services, thus transforming the
"healing profession" into a highly competitive business."
The Utah Supreme Court, in breaking from the approach of the
vast majority of jurisdictions, appears to have been particularly
concerned with the historical changes that have occurred in the
field of health care. The magnitude of changes appears to have
been greatest in the years between the late 19th century and the
1920's. During the 19th century, according to the court, hospitals
were considered true charities. Hospitals provided, custodial care
for those who were both ill and poor. Likewise during this time,
"[t]he hospitals' income was derived largely or entirely from chari55. See e.g., Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653 (Utah 1986);
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (hereinafter Intermountain Health Care.)
56. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
57. In Intermountain Health Care, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "the 'care of
the sick' has traditionally been an activity regarded as charitable in American law .
Id.
at 270.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 272.
60. The Utah Supreme Court speculated that "perhaps as a further evolutionary response to the unceasing rise in the cost of medical services, the provision of such services
has become a highly competitive business." Id.

1990

Comments

737

table donations, not government subsidies, taxes or patient fees."' 61
However, during this period of transformation, hospitals became
decreasingly dependent on voluntary gifts with the result that hospitals "developed into market institutions financed increasingly
out of payments from patients."6 2
To suggest that the change was one-dimensional would be inaccurate. In fact, "[t]he transformation was multidimensional: hospitals were redefined from social welfare to medical treatment institutions; their charitable foundation was replaced by a business
basis; and their orientation shifted to 'professionals and their patients,' away from 'patrons of the poor.' "63
The manifestation of this transformation could be seen in a variety of factors. Starr, in his work entitled The Social Transformation of American Medicine, suggested several factors were representative of this transformation during the late 19th century to the
1920's. First, the social composition of hospital patients shifted
away from being composed primarily of the poor, a composition
which was more reflective/representative of the population at
large.6' Second, paying patients increased, in both number and
percentage, as did the percentage of revenue derived from patient
fees. 65 Third, during this period, for the first time, physicians were
permitted to charge patients for their services in hospitals.66
Fourth, before 1880, less than two percent of physicians enjoyed
hospital privileges; yet by 1933, well over 80 percent of physicians
enjoyed hospital privileges.6 7 Fifth, an even more dramatic increase
occurred in that, according to census figures, the number of hospitals increased from 178 in 1872 to over 4000 in 1910.6 Sixth,
61. Id. at 270; citing, P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
at 150 (1982) (hereinafter P. Starr).
62. Id. citing, P. Starr at 146.
63. Id. citing, P. Starr, at 147:48.
64. Id. at 271 citing, P. Starr at 159. Starr further suggested that the change from
large wards to private rooms suggested the same movement away from the poor to the paying patients. Id.
65. Id.; citing, P. Starr at 161. This shift was dramatic: changing from revenues almost
entirely constituted by charitable donations in the 19th century to revenues in proportions
of over 65% derived from patients' fees; public appropriations accounting for 18%, endowment income accounting for 5.7%. Id.
66. Id.; citing, P. Starr at 163-164. The abandonment of the practice of not permitting
physicians to charge private patients for their services in hospitals had a dramatic effect. In
1880, virtually no hospital permitted a physician to charge patients fees. However, in New
England for example, by 1905, 47 of 52 hospitals surveyed permitted physicians to charge
for service to private patients. Id.
67. Id.; citing, P. Starr at 162, 167.
68. Id.; citing, P. Starr at 169.
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within the increase in the number of hospitals was a corresponding
substantial growth in for-profit hospitals organized by physicians
and corporations. 9
The factors which Starr set forth in his work appear to lay the
foundation for the court's rationale in Intermountain Health
Care. The court, in reference to Starr's factors, stated that "[a]ll of
the above factors indicate a substantial change in the nature of the
hospital; a part of that change was the gradual 70disappearance of
the traditional charitable hospital for the poor.
The court further stated that "[a]lso of considerable significance
to our review is the increasing irrelevance of the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals for purposes of discovering
the element of charity in their operations."' 7 ' The court relied upon
two theories as evidence of the proposition that the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit was no longer a relevant distinction
with respect to whether the hospital was engaged in charitable
operations.
The first theory or model was referred to as the "physicians' cooperative" model. 2 It had been theorized that nonprofit hospitals
operate primarily for the benefit of the participating physicians.
According to this theory, physicians were able to exercise control,
direct and indirect, over the nonprofit hospitals to which they
bring the patients, and consequently, were able to enjoy great
power and high income.7 3 This basic theory had also had minor
variations upon its basic theme.74
The second model was referred to as the "polycorporate enterprise" model.7 5 The focus of the "polycorporate enterprise" model
69. Id.; citing P. Starr at 170. This increase in growth in for-profit hospitals can be
linked to the improvement in the opportunity for profit in hospitals. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; citing, Pauley & Redish, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physician's Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 88-89 (1973). Pauley and Redish further theorized that
"[the nonprofit form is believed to facilitate the control by physicians better than the forprofit form." Intermountain Health Care 709 P.2d at 271, citing Pauley and Redish, The
Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physician's Co-operative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 88-89 (1973).
74. See, e.g., Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1416, 1436-37 (1980). Clark refers to the "physician's cooperative" model as the "exploitation hypothesis" and theorizes that the physician "income maximizing" system is hidden behind the nonprofit status of the hospital. Id.

See also, P.

STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

at 438 (1982).

Starr argues that many nonprofit hospitals are merely operating as "shelters" within which
physicians are able to operate profitable businesses, such as laboratories. Id.
75. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 271.
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was on non-profit hospital chains. Unlike the "physician's cooperative" model, "power is largely in the hands of the administrators,
not the physicians. '76 The focal point of this model though was not
so much on the power structure of the hospital but rather on the
business structure of the nonprofit hospitals. As a general proposition, nonprofit corporations can own for-profit corporations without losing their federal nonprofit tax status."
The Supreme Court of Utah, as a basis for its rationale, heavily
relied on this economic transition that hospitals and the medical
profession have experienced. In addition to this historical, economic transition of hospitals as a factor in the court's rationale
there was another factor which was of particular significance to the
court's rationale: the requirement in Utah that every charity show
an element of gift.7 s The economic reality of modern hospitals and
the requirement of an element of gift in every charity are critical
elements according to the Supreme Court of Utah. According to
the court, the analysis of these factors was what distinguished its
position and holding from that of other jurisdictions. 9
In making a determination as to whether a hospital will retain
its state constitutional tax exemption for property used for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court of Utah chose a case-by-case
method of analysis using a multifactor test.8 0 The multifactor test
used by the court consisted of six factors:
1.) Whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant service to others without immediate expectation of material reward; 2.)
whether the entity is supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts;
3.) whether the recipients of the "charity" are required to pay for assistance
received, in whole or in part; 4.) whether the income received from all
sources (gifts, donations, and payments from recipients) produces a "profit"
to the entity in the sense that the income exceeds operating and long-term
maintenance expenses; 5.) whether the beneficiaries of the "charity" are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, whether the restriction bears a
reasonable relationship to the entity's charitable objectives; and 6.) whether
dividends or some other form of financial benefit, or assets upon dissolution,

76. Id.
77. Id. at 271-272; citing, P. Starr, at 437. In order for a nonprofit corporation to
maintain its nonprofit tax exempt status, however, the profits of the for-profit corporations
must be used to further the nonprofit purposes of the nonprofit parent corporation. Id.
78. Intermountain Health Care 709 P.2d at 272.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 270, 272. The court emphasizes that each case must be decided on its own
facts, and that the factors of the test are not of equal value. Moreover, a hospital or institution is not required to satisfy every factor in order to be eligible for an exemption. Id. at
270.
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are available to private interests, and whether the entity is organized and
operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or incidental to
charitable ones."

In determining eligibility for charitable tax exemption, the burden
of proof is on the party (nonprofit hospital) seeking the
82
eligibility.
With respect to its analysis of the first factor, the court looked to
the articles of incorporation to determine the purpose of the entity. In Intermountain Health Care, the articles of incorporation
identified corporate purposes as including the care and treatment
of the "sick, afflicted, infirm, aged or injured." Moreover, the articles of incorporation restricted any portion of the net earnings
from distribution to the benefit of any private individual. Likewise,
the assets of the corporation upon dissolution were not to be distributed to benefit any private individual.8 3 According to the court,
these stated purposes satisfied the first element of the test."'
For the second factor, the court examined whether the hospitals
were supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts. The
court noted that the current operating expenses were covered almost entirely by revenue from patient charges and although there
was evidence of donations to the hospital, there was no evidence
that the donations resulted in charges below the prevailing market
rates.8 5
The Supreme Court of Utah rejected the dissent's notion that
"the element of charitable giving from private donors and benefactors to a nonprofit entity, without more, satisfies the requirement
of 'gift' in the definition of 'charitable purpose' under the Utah
Constitution."" Rather, the majority turned its analysis to the
third factor. That is, the majority considered the issue of whether
the recipients of the services of an entity were required to pay for
87
that assistance, in whole or in part.
81. Id. at 269-70.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 272-273.
84. Id. at 272.
85. Id. at 273. The court noted that the burden was on the party seeking the exemption to demonstrate the impact on the support, maintenance, and operation of the hospital
in the year in question. Id.
86. Id. In rejecting the dissent's position the majority noted that "[mlany institutions
are largely or partly created and supported by gifts but do not therefore automatically qualify for tax exemptions for their property." Id. at 273-74. As examples of their position, the
court included private, nonprofit schools, museums, libraries and zoos. Id. at 274.
87. Id. at 274. The majority considered the third factor to be the most significant in
the multifactor test. Id.
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In analyzing this third factor the court examined the record,
which showed that the vast majority of the services provided by
the hospitals in question were paid for by government programs,
private insurance companies or the individuals receiving care. The
court construed this as a "mere reciprocal exchange of services for
money" as opposed to charitable "giving" by the hospital to the
patient. 8 The majority seized upon the fact that the value of services given away as charity by the hospitals in question constituted
less than one percent of the their gross revenue. 9
The hospitals contended that the modern, economic realities of
operating a hospital (with respect to the great expense of modern
care and the wide availability of insurance and governmental subsidies) rendered the idea of a hospital solely supported by philanthropy an anachronism. It was this position, however, which the
majority stated was evidence that the distinction between forprofit and nonprofit hospitals had eroded. As the majority pointed
out, for-profit hospitals provided many of the same primary care
services as nonprofit hospitals and did so at rates similar to those
charged by nonprofit hospitals. Additionally the majority acknowledged that the "doctors and administrators of nonprofit hospitals
have the same opportunity for personal renumeration for these services as do their counterparts in for-profit hospitals."9 0
The majority also rejected another position of the dissent with
respect to this issue. The dissent suggested that the fact that the
hospitals would admit patients without requiring them to show
their ability to pay should be determinative of the question of
charitable purpose regardless of the actual amount of free care
provided by the hospital. The majority pointed out that for-profit
institutions could implement similar policies as well. According to
the majority, if the dissent's position were correct, the only means
for determining charitable exemptions would be a bright-line test
based solely on a for-profit/ nonprofit distinction which the majority viewed as unacceptable.9
88. Id.
89. Id. Also of significance to the majority was the fact that the free services which
were available to the public were deliberately not advertised "out of fear of a 'deluge of
people' trying to take advantage of it." Id. Instead, the hospitals made every effort to recover payment for services rendered, even affording patients the opportunity to obtain bank
loans to finance their hospital expenses. Id.
90. Id. at 274-75 citing Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 665,
124 S.E.2d 402, 403. (1962).
91. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 275. The majority stated that it would
not adopt the dissent's position because the Supreme Court of Utah had previously rejected
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The fourth factor was whether the income received from all
sources by the hospital was in excess of their operating and maintenance expenses. In answering the question, the court looked to a
number of factors. One of the factors was that because the vast
majority of services were paid for, the nonprofit hospitals in this
case were able to accumulate capital.92 A second factor was directed towards organizations which own more than one hospital or
health care facility. The primary focus with respect to this element
was whether surplus funds were channeled to for-profit entities or
to entities or facilities outside the taxing jurisdiction." A third
query was whether a large portion of profits was used for capital
improvements and new, updated equipment. 4
With respect to whether income exceeded the operating and
maintenance expenses of a hospital, the primary concern of the
court was that non-profit hospitals receiving a charitable exemption would receive an undue advantage over their competitors, forprofit hospitals. The majority stated that "there is a serious question regarding the constitutional property of subsidies from
[county]taxpayers being used to give certain entities a substantial
competitive edge in what is essentially a commercial
marketplace."95
The final two factors in the test were whether the beneficiaries
of the services of the hospital were restricted in any way and
whether private interests were benefitted by the organization or
operation of the hospital. The court did not elaborate on what
types of restrictions would be necessary in order to satisfy the fifth
factor. With respect to the final factor the primary inquiry was
whether an officer, employee, or shareholder of the hospital or entity controlling the hospital received any distribution of the
assets.9
The approach taken by the Supreme Court of Utah did not revolve entirely around the charitable tax exemption afforded nonprofit hospitals. The court, instead effectively restricted the availaa unilateral test, based on a for-profit/nonprofit distinction, as the sole means of identifying
"charitable purposes" under the Utah Constitution (see, William Budge Memorial Hospital
v. Maughan, 79 Utah 516, 3 P.2d 258 (Utah 1931)). 709 P.2d at 275.
92. Id. The significance of this factor, apparently, is that accumulation of profits is a
characteristic of for-profit hospitals in the opinion of the court. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 275-76. Again, the court was concerned with the nonprofit hospital exhibiting a characteristic often found in for-profit hospitals. Id.
95. Id. at 276.
96. Id.
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bility of the charitable tax exemption by declaring that "[p]roperty
used exclusively for hospital purposes is not automatically being
used for charitable purposes, even where the hospital is nonprofit." 97 Rather, in order to obtain/retain the exemption, the burden was on the hospital to show that it satisfied the multifactor
test set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court of Utah
in IntermountainHealth Care likewise have been expressed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in cases concerning charitable organizations.18 In general, both jurisdictions have expressed concerns regarding organizations which receive charitable organization
tax exemptions and whether or not these organizations are truly
charitable in nature and thus warrant the receipt of such tax exemptions. Both jurisdictions have promulgated multi-factor tests
in order to evaluate whether an organization is truly charitable.
The tests set forth by each jurisdiction center on similar concerns
and contain similar factors as well.9 9 Among the common concerns
are whether the organization relieves the government of some of its
burdens, 10 0 whether there has been an accumulation of profits
which is invested to upgrade equipment 1° and the degree of compensation available to officers, directors and administrators.0 2
As the Supreme Court of Utah and other authorities have suggested, there has been a revolution in the health care profession
which has transformed the healing profession into big business.
Many nonprofit hospitals are currently enjoying substantial profits
yet providing relatively little charity to the communities in which
they are located.10 3 Moreover, in addition to substantial profits, officers of these hospitals are enjoying substantial revenues. 0 4 In
light of these trends and evolutions, the time has come to reevalu97. Id. at 287.
98. Compare e.g. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) with Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa 1985).
99. See supra, notes 38 and 77 and accompanying text.
100. See e.g., Yorgason v. County Board of Education, 714 P.2d 653, 660 (Utah 1986)
and Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d 1306, 1315 (Pa. 1985).
101. See supra, notes 51 and 90 and accompanying text.
102. See supra, notes 51 and 86 and accompanying text.
103. See supra, note 4.
104. See supra, note 4. According to an article in The Pittsburgh Press, the president
of Allegheny General Hospital earned $ 258,866 in fiscal year 1988. The Pittsburgh Press,
Feb. 05, 1990, at A 13, col. 1.
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ate, on a case by case basis, the charitable organization tax exemption which nonprofit hospitals in Pennsylvania currently enjoy.
The result of such a reevaluation would be to bring nonprofit hospitals within the same guidelines to which other organizations
seeking charitable tax exemptions are subject.
Robert J. Hannen

